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ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

Phillip J, Bryson*

Economy and "New Economy" in the
United States and Germany
The expression "New Economy" is used inconsistently. This article reviews the driving
forces of the US boom of the 1990s, examining the changes introduced in the period
and before, focusing on the IT sector and new technologies. The "New Economy" is not
just the new sectors, but changes in the overall economy emanating from them. These
changes will not evaporate in an economic slowdown. Comparisons of the USA with
Germany and Europe illustrate that the "New Economy" will also continue to develop
there on the foundations already laid.

S

ince the US economy is an engine of growth for
the world and its large market is a beacon to the
exporters of many nations, much of the world is interested in having some notion of where the economy is
and whither it is tending. Having the leading economy
of Europe, Germany is of critical importance for the
European Union and also represents a significant
global force.
On both sides of the Atlantic observers have
wondered whether the United States may be leading
the world into a new economic era. The US
economy's continuing strong performance has established new parameters and possibilities for economic
success, even to the extent that many believe they
have discovered a "New Economy". The serviceoriented economy, now based on information and
other technologies, has undergone changes so
sweeping that the very nature of economic activity
seems to be based upon new rules.
Is that New Economy anywhere on the horizon in
Germany, or is it a part of Germany's future? The
German and American economies may be out of
cyclical synchronization, and perhaps that is
fortunate. But with the international spread of
technologies, they can be expected to tend toward a
common level, with the German economy showing
the way for Europe.
The question as to whether the economy can appropriately be described as "new" can be addressed
in the context of the current North American prosperity, encompassing not only the bright possibilities,
but also the distinct perils of its future. Of the two
propositions addressed by this paper - that the
economy has changed in terms of its fundamental
structure and that the changes have produced a
'Associate director, The David M. Kennedy Center for International
Studies, and Professor of Economics, The Marriott School, Brigham
Young University, Provo, Utah, USA.
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boom - the former seems more significant. Especially
since the boom has recently been approaching either
a new phase or an end. Again, the main question is
whether fundamental changes have permanently altered the nature of and prospects for growth and
change.
This article will first examine the productivity and
performance of the US and German economies. It will
then review the foundations laid in the past through
economic reorganization, strategic investments, and
international realignment, before looking at the role of
high tech and the internet, the sectors generally and
inappropriately labeled the "New Economy". It then
focuses on the relationship between trade and growth
and whether the combined old and new sectors are
increasingly open, and goes on to address the intangibles of economic growth: corporate governance,
the regulatory environment, and business confidence.
Next, the stock market, the wealth effect, and the
boom are investigated as is the question whether
business cycles are history. Subsequently, the
weaknesses and potential problems of the US
economy in this new millennium are considered:
savings rates, imports, personal indebtedness, and
the durability of positive expectations. In conclusion
an answer is presented to the question: "Whither the
New Economy in the USA and in Europe?"
Current Productivity and Economic Performance
The economy of the United States enjoyed solid
expansion during the 1990s. Was that expansion, together with its effects and causes, sufficient to warrant the designation "New Economy"? In Germany, a
period of fiscal trial following reunification with its
leveraged Eastern resuscitation, appears now to be
moving toward full economic reinvigoration. The European community is also coming under the influence
of currency convergence. One should be warned
against drawing inferences about the strength or potential strength of the European economies based
INTERECONOMICS, July/August 2001
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upon the market value of the euro from its introduction through the period of decline that followed. At
the same time, although the new currency will reduce
transactions costs within Europe significantly, the
new monetary regime will not alone produce a European "New Economy".

or were beset with high levels of both inflation and
unemployment.4 In.the boom of the 1980s huge
federal budget deficits had grown out of an expansionary fiscal policy offset by the tight monetary policy
response to the inflationary period of the seventies
and its aftermath.

When the American economic boom began in the
early 1990s, the foundations of economic renewal
had already been laid, but it was later in the decade
that the resurgence became apparent, then robust.
Those foundations will be discussed below. Through
the larger part of the decade, it became" increasingly
apparent that the American economy was generally
stronger than it had been in a very long time.

In the boom of the nineties, fiscal policy has been
restrictive and monetary policy accommodative. The
result has been the longest period of economic expansion in US history, featuring a Utopian concatenation of declining unemployment, wage and price stability, rising productivity, and strong economic
growth. Productivity growth in the US, reports Krugman, has accelerated, "perhaps from the 1 percent
per annum norm of recent decades to 2 percent or
more."5 He indicates that in 1995 the rate of growth
of potential US output would have been put at slightly more than 2 percent by the conventional view, and
the natural unemployment rate estimated at not
much less than 6 percent. "It now seems plausible
that the rate of potential growth is around 3 and the
natural rate below 5".6 If this improvement is sustainable, output in 2005 will be nearly a quarter greater
than would have been projected only a few years
ago.

Germany, newly reunited and a leading player in the
European Monetary Union, appeared on track for a
brilliant future in 1990. But when the reconstruction
costs for the former German Democratic Republic
were much higher than the Kohl government anticipated, German fiscal policy was impacted heavily. At
the same time, the high costs of the social market
economy reflected the structural inflexibility of
Germany's social welfare policies, which had become
responsible' for distressingly high unemployment.
These phenomena are commonly referred to as
"Eurosclerosis", which is not exclusively a German
phenomenon. Nor has this complex of problems been
overcome, although the German economy is now
breaking out of the stagnation of the 1990s.
The American Decade
As the nineties began, the US economy appeared
to be stagnating. At that point in time, still well before
the onset of the Asian crisis, it was probably a
consensus among professional observers that the
Asian model had proved successful and that it might
already be too late for Americans to learn from the
Japanese and the Koreans.1 Thurow was convinced
that a national strategy or national industrial policy
reflecting the Japanese virtues would be essential to
the survival of US global competitiveness.2 Porter
Wrote that the government's role in generating international competitiveness was a vital, "if not the most
important, influence" in national economic performance. The policies of the Japanese and Korean
governments were "associated with the success
these nations' firms have enjoyed".3
At the height of the gloom and doom discussion,
the United States was just about to enter a period of
economic expansion of record-breaking power and
longevity. That boom would be fundamentally
different from those preceding it. The long expansions
of the 1960s and 1980s had been flawed by inflationary tendencies when employment levels were high
INTERECONOMICS, July/August 2001

Krugman sees this as a strong performance, but
scarcely finds it miracle-like. He suggests that the US
economy would not appear nearly as dramatic if the
European and Asian situations were not relatively
weak. In his view, no single European nation7 can
become as strong as the United States, or even
Japan, so the future of Europe will be determined by
1

Lodge, obviously an advocate of the Asian model, found that the
US government has "not pursued long-term economic goals...it has
also operated on market principles under which it is not the role of
government to plan for the competitiveness of the economy in the
world" Cf. George C. L o d g e : Korean Development and Western
Economics, Boston 1996 (revised), Harvard Business School, p. 8. It
was his view that American firms were operating under the disadvantage that "the overriding responsibility of managers is not to the
nation but to shareholders...not with the long-run health of the enterprise they theoretically own (sic !) but with quick and generous returns
to their clients" (ibid.) Lodge snared the view, quite popular at the
time, that "a critical function of the government-business partnership
was the identification of particular industrial sectors" (ibid., p. 9) in an
industrial targeting policy. He praised the "Confucian perspective"
that the planning bureaucracy should and would provide leadership
to "provide for, to enrich, and to educate the people. Bureaucrats are
not merely government functionaries, but leaders, intellectuals, and
teachers" (ibid., p. 10).
2
Lester T h u r o w : Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle
Among Japan, Europe, and America, New York 1993, Warner.
3

Michael E. P o r t e r : The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New
York 1990, The Free Press, p. 126.
4

United Nations: World Economic and Social Survey 1999: Trends
and Policies in the World Economy, New York 1999.

5

Paul . K r u g m a n : Can America Stay on Top?, in: Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol.14 (2000), No.1, pp. 169-175, here p.
170.
•

6

Ibid.
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the continent's ability to engender cohesion and selfconfidence. However, the euro and monetary
integration will not alone place Europe in an
ascendant position in a North Atlantic balance of
power.
As we will see below, the American performance
can be traced back to technical creativity. An
excellent measure of this creativity and its impact on
the internet economy's boom in the 1990s is the
number of patents granted in the USA. There has
been an explosion in the number of patents granted in
the United States in recent years. Considering that
some information technologies are changing so
rapidly that the pursuit of patent protection can be
viewed as meaningless for those areas, the large
numbers of patents applied for and granted is
especially impressive. Discoveries in the information
economy are at the heart of what has happened in the
US economy.
Figure 1
Patents Granted Since 1900

nately, the long-standing structural unemployment
problem in the Federal Republic was exacerbated
by the resulting tight-money situation. On occasion,
Western German unemployment has exceeded
eleven percent; in the east, the rate has been close to
20 % in recent years.10
In the aftermath of the reunification decade, the
German finance establishment is on a "consolidation
course" to restrict spending and reduce public sector
deficits. The Federal Republic's goal is to achieve a
balanced budget by no later than 2006. Tax reductions, also on a "quite impressive scale",11 have been
designed to stimulate private spending. Higher taxes
on energy consumption are to encourage economic
use of energy resources. The reduction of deficits and
debt are to reduce "squeezing out" by taking pressure
off bond markets. High interest rates have been no
great problem for the inflation-combating Germans,
but other countries in the region, fearing capital
outflows, have also had to maintain higher interest
rates than they desired.
While Germany labored under the strain of reunification, another very significant development was in
process. German corporate governance, traditionally
based on commercial and industrial finance through
the banking system, began to show a preference for
change. The development of the German stock
market, the Dax, as a means inter alia of generating
venture capital for high tech and information industries, began to support the development of a nascent,
New Economy.

o
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990

Economic Reorganization and
Strategic Investments in the USA

S o u r c e : Department of Commerce (Patent and Trademark Office);
see Economic Report of the President, 2000, p. 122.

The German Recovery
Immediately following German reunification, a
campaign to reconstruct the new Bundeslander was
launched. Since taxpayers were promised that no tax
increase would accompany reunification, the reconstruction was financed by public debt. Unfortunately,
the costs were much higher than expected. The ratio
of public spending to GDP increased from about 46%
in 1989 to almost 5 1 % by 1996.8 The ratio of public
debt to GDP increased from just under 42% to nearly
6 1 % in those years. Budget deficits of the Federal
Republic were also high in the 1990s, but came down
from 3.4% of GDP in 1996 to 2.6 % in 1997 and 1.7 %
in 1998.9
Reconstruction outlays based on federal borrowing
would have proven much more inflationary, had they
not been countered by high interest rates. Unfortu-
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The period following the Second World War was
characterized by excess capacity generation in the
United States, a process which carried on into the
7

There are obvious pitfalls that must be avoided in comparing a
country like Germany to the United States, or even the continent of
Europe to the USA, as Rothschild reminds us. Cf. Kurt W.
R o t h s c h i l d : Europe and the USA: Comparing What with What?,
in: Kyklos, Vol. 53 (2000), No. 3, pp. 249-264. To set the reader's mind
at rest, I will not be making refined, statistical comparisons of
economic outcomes, but will be looking primarily at prospects that
might be implied at some future point by today's inputs, e.g. as a
result of investments etc. See the end of the paper where Stierle is
quoted, showing that measures such as Europe's investments in IT
equipment lag behind those of the USA, but can be expected
ultimately to match those of the latter.
8

Hermann R e m s p e r g e r : Is There a New Economy in Germany?,
in: Deutsche Bundesbank: Auszuge aus Presseartikeln, No.14, 20
March 2000, pp. 14-18.

9

Federal Ministry of Finance: German Stability Program: December
1999 Update, Berlin 1999.

10

Federal Ministry of Finance: The Economic Situation in the Federal
Republic of Germany, Berlin 2000, Monthly Report Nos.1-2.

11

Hermann R e m s p e r g e r , op. cit, p. 16.
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1970s.\ Stock prices were generally depressed
because a substantial share of the capital stock was
underutilized; there was little demand for the products
of numerous industries and changing technologies left
capacities obsolete in others. Nevertheless, managers
refused to downsize their activities; in fact, they
continued to increase their investments. The result
was that share prices remained low and unproductive
assets accumulated. What better incentive could be
provided for corporate takeovers than making the
price of ownership low and the accumulated assets of
ownership large?
In the 1960s, many large conglomerates had been
formed; their parent companies brought large
numbers of separate and disparate businesses under
single management. The corporate decision-making
powers were located at conglomerate headquarters,
but particular managerial information and specific
managerial knowledge were located in the dispersed
and separate corporate divisions. So while noting the
low ratio of share prices to corporate assets, competitive managerial outsiders monitored firms that were
excessively large and unmanageable. They felt
confident they could take over such firms and
produce greater profits and higher share prices. As
corporate debt could be arranged with facility,
leveraged takeovers and buyouts became the order of
the day.
A good share of the American public saw the 1980s
era of mergers and acquisitions as a game of
corporate greed and intrigue but, as a precursor of the
expansion of the nineties, it should be seen12 as a
preparatory period of industrial restructuring and as a
process of forcing many inefficiently managed firms to
make their departure from the industrial scene. The
effect was that the value of public equity in the United
States more than doubled (from $1.4 to $3 trillion in a
decade), the decline in productivity was reversed, real
income was increased over the period by about a
third, and record levels were established for expenditures on research and development.

was back down to 15.3 and by 1994 to 14.6% of
GDP. So these expenditures were substantial from
about the mid-1970s into the 1990s.
, Strategic investments also undergird the boom
decade of the 1990s in the United States. Table 1
reviews US private fixed investment and two of its key
components:- first, expenditures for information
processing equipment and software for selected
years between 1960 and 1999; second, expenditures
for industrial equipment. In this period the share of
private investment dedicated to information
processing equipment and software began to grow
slowly with the initially tentative application of new
technologies. Thereafter, it increased dramatically and
monotonically as a percentage of total investment.
Approximately six and one-half percent of total private
investment expenditures in 1960 were for information
processing equipment and software. By 1999 the
share had increased to nearly twenty-six percent of
the total. Private fixed investment overall was a rising
share of GDP throughout the period. The strength of
these investments, particularly as they provided the
information foundation of the New Economy, were the
foundation of the US economic expansion of the
1990s. The boom was really based more, on investments in computer equipment and software than on
traditional equipment, and the growing use of IT
technologies began to produce new economic
outcomes.
Table 1
US Private Investment in Information Processing
and Industrial Equipment, 1960-1999
($ billions)1
Year

As a part of this process, major investments were
being made that would prepare the economy for the
expansion that followed and provide a new technological foundation for future growth. In the period
from 1970 to 1995, total private gross fixed investment started out at below 15% of GDP. It increased
to 16.4% in 1974, to 18.8% in 1979, then stayed
around 17 or 18% until the mid-1980s. By 1989 it
1
12

Zoltan J. A c s and Daniel A. G e r l o w s k i : Managerial
Economics and Organization, New Jersey 1996, Prentice-Hall.
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PFI
IPE
IPE/PFI
IE
IE/PFI
(Private
(Information (IPE as (Industrial (IE as
Fixed
Processing
%of
Equipment) %of
Investment) Equipment
PFI)
PFI)
and Software)

1960

75.7

4.9

6.47

9.3

12.3

1970
1975

.. 150.4

16.7

11.10

20.2

13.4

236.5

28.2

11.92

31.1

13.2

1980

484.2

69.6

14.37

60.4

12.5

1982

531.0

88.9

16.74

62.3

11.7

1984

670.1

121.7

18.16

67.6

10.1

1986

740.7

137.6

18.58

74.8

10.1

1988

802.7

155.9

19.42

83.5

10.4

1990

847.2

176.1

20.79

91.5

10.8

1994

1034.6

233.7

22.59

113.3

11.0

1998

1460.0

356.9

24.45

150.2

10.3

1999

1577.4

407.2

25.81

151.4

9.6

Quarterly Data at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates.

S o u r c e s : Economic Report of the President, 2000, Table B-16, p.
326; and own calculations.
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The German Economic Realignment

The Role of High Tech and the Internet

Will the economic upswing already declared underway by the German economics establishment be
more than merely cyclical in character? Remsperger,
Stierle and others are hopeful that it will shift the
growth trend of the economy upwards.13 They are
convinced that is what happened in the United States
in the 1990s and that with a willingness to pursue appropriate policy initiatives, that result will follow in the
Federal Republic.

The internet and e-commerce have been of
undeniable importance in the so-called New
Economy. Following as a logical extension of the
computer's capabilities, the development of the
internet economy has been the most important
feature of the boom of the 1990s.

There are high hopes in most of Europe that
economic integration, developing in Europe since the
establishment of the European Coal and Steel
Community in 1950 and evolving through other
subsequent institutional variants, will continue to be a
driving force in an increasingly unified economy. The
European integration process creates and diverts
international trade. Trade is created by expanding the
internal market of the community at the same time as
it is being diverted from wonted patterns between
community members and outsider nations. This
realigned trade generates net benefits in the form of
lower prices for consumers and larger markets and
enhanced trading possibilities for producers. The
consumer benefits derived from trade expansion are
larger to the extent that community producers can
operate at price and quality levels close to those of
world class producers, which is often the case in
Europe. Additionally, expanding trade will promote
structural adjustments in industry and result in cost
savings and greater competitiveness for producers as
they incur economies of scale and scope. Advocates
of integration tend to believe that the larger integration
benefits stem from these dynamic effects, which have
been at work for some time as European integration
has progressed. Such effects are currently being
complemented by the monetary integration that will
reduce transactions costs in integrated markets.
As industries take advantage of new competitive
possibilities, they will likely experience a sustained
increase in industrial productivity. This is also part of
Europe's hope for a New Economy, but it cannot be
expected to develop without the technical amelioration of the information industries. If the "newness"
of the New Economy is not merely some beneficial
but ephemeral aberration, it will prove susceptible to
transplantation. Obviously, the characteristics of the
US economy of the 1990s and thereafter will be
subject to replication in technical fields and in relevant
industries. They will be so in Europe and Asia at an
early date, especially in Germany, the economic
leader of the European Union.
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At the beginning of this new century, the service
sector provides the largest number of jobs and
generates nearly two-thirds of GDP in the United
States. Knowledge-based industries such as finance,
insurance, business, legal and other professional
services have led the growth of the services sector.
We shall briefly review analyses of the contributions of
the high tech industries to economic growth in the
following.
The capital market provides evidence of the impact
of information technology (IT) on the economy. In the
first half of 1999, the venture capital industry raised
$25 billion at an annual rate. Approximately two-thirds
of this total, over $16 billion, went to the IT sector,
and of this roughly $12 billion went into Internet
companies. In terms of market capitalization, the IT
hardware sector now accounts for about 14 percent
of the US total; a decade ago it was only six percent.
Today's software component of about 9 percent was
at a mere two percent in 1989. Of the total value of US
stocks, those in the internet sector represent about
4 percent.14
Role of the New Economy in
US Economic Growth
The dramatic diffusion of computer-based technologies was possible in good measure because of
the rapid decline in the prices of computer equipment. Jorgenson and Stiroh15 argue that this resulted
not in economy-wide technical change (creating
greater output from the same inputs), but in massive
substitution of computers for labor and other; equipment in home and business sector use. Normally, in
technical productivity measurement the use of capital
equipment produces "spillovers", residual economic
growth beyond that directly attributable to capital
and labor. Interestingly, the economic expansion of

13

Cf. Hermann R e m s p e r g e r , op. cit.; and Michael. H. S t i e r l e :
New Economy - Wunschtraum oder Realitat, in: Wirtschaftsdienst,
Vol.80, No.9, Sept. 2000, pp. 549-556.
14

Economic Report of the President, Washington 2000, pp.104-105.

15

Dale W. J o r g e n s o n and Kevin J. S t i r o h : Information
Technology and Growth, in: American Economic Review, Vol.89
(1999), No.2, pp. 109-115.
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the 1990s did not produce an increase in total factor
productivity, or in output per unit of factor input.
Jorgenson and Stiroh show that from 1948-1973,
output grew 3.4 percent per year, with capital and
consumers' durables producing 43 percent and labor
producing 32 percent of the total growth. Total factor
productivity accounted for. the remaining 25 percent.
But output growth slowed sharply after 1973, and
registered another, smaller decline after 1990.
The rate of growth of output was 2.4 percent per
year from 1990 to 1996. Note that computers
contributed to growth in this period as a "service flow"
to households as well as directly as an investment
good. Since 1990, computers have been responsible
for almost.a sixth of the annual 2.4 percent output
growth: they represented nearly 20 percent of the
capital input's contribution to growth and 14 percent
of the services contribution of consumer durables.
The bottom line of research by Jorgenson and Stiroh
is that computer-related gains are fundamentally
changing the economy, but not by producing growth
spillover effects to the economy as a whole. Returns
to the economy's investments in IT equipment have
been captured by computer. producers and users
themselves as they substitute this equipment for other
inputs.
It does appear that the "New Economy" is responsible for an increase in system-wide productivity.
From the middle of the seventies, productivity clearly
slowed down, prohibiting a growth of incomes. But it
was expected that the introduction of new
technologies, especially in information processing
and telecommunications, could reverse this trend.
Advocates of the idea of a New Economy pointed to
the lag between the implementation' of new
technologies and the appearance of productivity
effects. Heilemann16 et al. show that the quarterly
productivity rates since about 1995 do in fact seem to
indicate an upward shift in the trend. The time period
in question is a brief one, so it is difficult to be certain
whether the rather dramatic increases will in fact be
sustained. There have been periods of increasing
productivity in the past, especially in the last phases
of cyclical upturns, that did after a time prove to have
been strictly temporary.
Characteristics of the New Economy
The separate question of whether there is more to
the New Economy than increasing productivity and
rapid growth is also of great significance. The issue is
that the New Economy constrains the managers of
firms to behave according to different principles. Let
INTERECONOMICS, July/August 2001

us consider just three of the major changes that raise
the question whether there must be a new economics
to address the analytical riddles of the New Economy.
First, it is argued that the notion of profit maximization cannot be applied as is traditionally done.17 The
information economy incurs fixed costs of production, but having generated at the outset the information that can be used for various production and marketing purposes, the marginal costs of such information products, normally to be equated to marginal
revenues, are zero. Thus,'some would claim the rules
of neoclassical economics no longer hold, a proposition hard to take seriously.18
Second, the classic question of whether the firm
should make or buy a product, component, or service, cannot be answered in the New Economy in the
traditional way. As a result of being incapable of addressing these problems in the new ways now appropriate, a number of major firms have encountered extreme difficulties. Finally, because it has become possible in this electronic age to separate pure
information characteristics from the information associated with production, it becomes possible to formulate decisions to use and/or to sell for both kinds
of information, and business decision-making assumes new dimensions. But Shapiro and Varian
forcefully defend the view that in spite of important
changes in the economic system, analysis does not
require "a brand new economics";19 current analytical
tools can address these new issues quite adequately.
Much of the "newness" of this economy, of course,
arises from the growing share of world commerce
transacted on-line. The magnitude of transactions
costs savings achieved through the new medium
might prove to be of revolutionary proportions and the
rapid growth of e-commerce has convinced many that
we are seeing a New Economy. These developing
phenomena will not prove different in Germany or
other leading world economies as techniques are
16

Ullrich H e i l e m a n n , Roland D o h r n , Hans Dietrich von
L o e f f e l h o l z and Elke S c h a f e r - J a c k l e l : Der Wirtschaftsaufschwung der Vereinigten Staaten in den neunziger Jahren - Rolle
und Beitrag makrodkonomischer Faktoren, Essen 2000, RheinischWestfalisches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, p. 36.
17

See, for example, Peter K a l m b a c h : Eine neue Wirtschaft im
neuen Jahrtausend?, in: Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol.80 (2000), No.4, pp.
210-217.
18
Never mind that zero marginal costs are not a problem in the noncompetitive situation often expected to prevail in the new economy.
One simply selects the point on the (downward sloping) demand
curve at the output where marginal revenues equate to zero.
19
Carl S h a p i r o and Hal R. V a r i a n : Information Rules: A
Strategic Guide to the Network Economy, Boston (Mass.) 1999,
Harvard Business School Press.
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replicated and routinized. One sign that the economywide adjustments to this new economic era are being
made is the growth of mergers and acquisitions in
Europe. These phenomena permit scale economies to
capture the new cost-reducing aspects of information, and for this reason they have become ever
more significant in Germany, Europe and Asia.
Expanding Exports and Ballooning Imports
Over the past few decades, the economy of the
United States has become increasingly open.
Measuring the economy's openness as the ratio of all
exported and imported goods and services to the
GDP, the United States had reached 29.3% in 1998,
compared to Japan's 18.1%. Heilemann et al.20
indicate that even the openness ratio of the euro zone,
if calculated exclusive of intra-European Union trade,
would not be much higher.
These analysts also note that US trade with the
developing countries (40% of the total) is significantly
larger than Germany's (16%); while the share of
American trade with the countries transitioning from
plan to market is only about one percent, Germany's
is about 10 percent.
The contribution of US exports to the growth of
GDP has increased in recent years, but has not been
as rapid as that of its famed imports. The appreciation
of the dollar on foreign currency markets, the very
modest prices of petroleum imports before the rejuvenation of OPEC in 1999, and more than robust
consumer demand have all contributed to the huge
balance of trade deficits long characteristic of US
trade.
As the US economy has become more tightly
integrated with world markets, it has been increasingly apparent that trade is a prime driver of economic
growth. Frankel and Romer21 show that the effect of
trade on income is quantitatively larger; it is more
significant and robust than we have generally
suspected. Globalization and the increasingly open
world _economy played an important role in 1990s
prosperity.
22

Jones attributes US economic growth since 1950
to "increases in educational attainment, increases in
research intensity, and the increased openness and
development of the world economy." He concludes
that when these increases cease and a steady state is
reached, growth per capita "can be expected to fall to
a rate of approximately 1A its post-war average."
23

In more recent research, Frankel and Romer take
a new approach to demonstrating the contribution of
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trade to growth. Because the obvious existence of
correlation between trade and growth cannot prove
anything about causation, they look to specific
geographic characteristics which have important
impacts on trade and are plausibly uncorrelated with
other income determinants. Measures of important
geographic characteristics, viz., country size,
distance from trading partners, whether they have a
common border, or whether they are landlocked,
become determinants of overall trade and are used to
estimate instrumental variables establishing the effect
of trade on income. Their conclusion is that a "rise of
one percentage point in the ratio of trade to GDP
increases income per person by at least one-half
percent".24 Income is enhanced by trade because the
latter promotes the accumulation of capital, both
physical and human. Moreover, trade increases the
output associated with a given capital stock. From
their results they also infer that within-country trade
produces higher incomes, since larger countries with
more substantial internal trade have higher incomes.
Like international trade, within-country trade raises
income at given levels of capital as well as through
capital accumulation. Since their results fail to
demonstrate that ordinary least-squares estimates
overstate the positive effects of trade, they conclude
that trade has a large and robust, though only moderately statistically significant, positive effect on income.
The interpretation they suggest for their research
results is that the case for the benefits of trade is
strengthened.
The Intangibles of Economic Growth
Much has been said about the role of the government in maintaining an appropriate economic environment and sustaining through judicious policy the
robustness of the economy. MacAvoy25 looks back to
the Reagan era, emphasizing the importance of
deregulation and the reduction of government intervention in the marketplace. Heilemann et al.26 find
that "it is natural to see in the liberalization, the
20
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deregulation and privatization, and the institutional
changes of the eighties important causes for the
boom of the nineties." One should be cognizant of
the efforts made during the Bush administration to
overcome the fiscal insufficiencies of those and directly prior years. Opinion polls would seem to suggest the inference that all of the growth impetus of
the past eight years is exclusively due to the economic management of the White House.
In a sweeping study of new evidence on economic
growth, Temple27 addresses the proximate causes of
economic growth, beginning with investments in
physical capital, human capital, R&D, and even "wider
influences on growth." Under these latter rubrics, he
examines "government size" and "social and political
factors." Pertaining to size, one could argue that high
levels of social security transfers and government
consumption could impair an economy's growth
performance, but the studies reviewed by Temple did
not deliver any compelling evidence of this. A
negative link between growth and government
consumption has been tested, but as yet no correlation between the two "leaps out from the data".28
Theoretical papers have begun to test the relation
between social institutions and incentives. Although it
is impossible to measure such concepts as social
capital or social capability, Temple sees progress in
researching these issues. Social and political influences on growth might be measurable as latent
variables related to observable indicators. Some
attempts are being made to measure these variables
as related to economic development in the advanced
market economies. Temple argues that simple
analytical techniques have a great deal of potential
and that recent theoretical work reinforces the case
for further study.29
Perhaps we will one day have more quantitative
understanding of the effects of such policies as
deregulation. In the meantime, although many do not
doubt that governmental activities have an important
impact on growth, it is certainly difficult to demon26
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strate or quantify it. We will for a time be left to
exercise non-empirical judgment in attempting to
evaluate these factors.
The Stock Market, the Wealth Effect,
and the Boom
The boom of the nineties, according to Heilemann
et al.,30 was driven by private consumption, which in
turn experienced a fillip in the form of continual,
relatively strong population growth. The growth
contribution of private consumption expenditures
represented more than two percentage points (or two
thirds) of GDP growth. Changes in the age structure of
the population produced direct economic effects of
considerable magnitude. The number of school-age
children, for example, increased again in the 1990s,
which produced in that decade an additional 1.5
million jobs in the public schools and another 600,000
in private schools. In the past two major boom
periods in the United States, a one percent increase in
population has produced a growth rate increase of
three percent per year.
The popular media have reported that the "wealth
effect," stemming from the continuing, dramatic increase in share prices, encouraged heavy consumption expenditures. So heavy were these expenditures,
that private savings remained very small, even becoming negative as the nineties came to an end. The
common wisdom was that people no longer felt the
need to save, since their stock market earnings were
increasing so dramatically. Even where consumers
were without significant shareholdings, many were
enrolled in private retirement programs and could observe their potential retirement income increasing
substantially. One would certainly expect such gains
to encourage current consumption.
In the decade beginning in 1990, US households
saw their real net worth increase by nearly $15 trillion,
or by more than 50 percent. Of total wealth creation in
that decade, more than 60 percent was produced by
rising stock values.31 One might be suspicious that
this wealth effect was not the sole force driving
consumption in the 1990s because stock holdings are
highly concentrated and could not directly affect
decisions for all consumers. About half of corporate
stocks are held by the top 1 percent of equity holders,
whereas only 4.1 percent are held by the bottom
30
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80 percent of households.32 The consumption that
drove the boom was not merely that of the small
minority who held significant amounts of shares.
Poterba's review of empirical studies on this
question suggests a consensus finding that stock
market gains affect consumer spending by a value of
about 0.03. This is significant, since even if
consumers had spent not three cents, but just 1 cent
of each additional dollar of stock market gains from
1989 to 1999, the decade's total consumer expenditures would still have been $96 billion (approximately
1.5 percent) higher. In reviewing the consumption
expenditures of the upper income brackets, Poterba
shows that luxury goods were in heavy demand.
Lower income groups consumed heavily as well,
made confident not only by gains in share values, but
by strong general growth as well, although he admits
that "there is little empirical evidence at this stage to
qualify such an affect".33 Heilemann et al. are not very
impressed with this wealth effect argument, attributing the consumption boom instead to the period's favorable interest rates, which motivated spending for
durable goods.
As the market became ever more favorable to
shareholders, potential capital gains grew. National
income accounting does not calculate capital gains as
part of personal income, but if it did, savings would be
the residual after deducting consumption from,
income plus capital gains. As capital gains grow,
effective savings grow as well. If these capital gains
are not considered part of income, savings are very
low or even negative. Heilemann et al. would remind
us that capital gains are not really experienced until
the shares that produce them are actually sold and
the cash is in hand. To the extent that they spent more
freely, Americans enjoying large potential capital gains
in this period were behaving as if they were counting
"illusory" gains as,income.
When "Black Friday," April 17th, 2000, introduced
an extended process of market adjustment, shares on
the Dow had not been nearly as inflated in terms of
price/earnings ratios as on the NASDAQ where share
prices were clearly overvalued and underwent a
distinct market correction. The big concern at that
time was whether the economy could yet enjoy a "soft
landing" after having soared through the nineties. If
shareholders were to perceive their capital gains as
threatened and were to reconsider their consumption
' Ibid., p.101.
'Ibid., p.116.
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activity on that basis, reduced consumer spending
could end the boom quickly.
Are Business Cycles History?
In the recent past, an impression that the business
cycle is largely a thing of the past seems to have been
gaining currency. Some see fortuitous changes in the
economic environment as tending to make the US
economy recession-proof. Zarnowitz34 presents and
evaluates some of the arguments that certain of the
factors which promote productivity growth in the
economy also tend to promote greater economic
stability. He presents seven arguments for the claim
that cycles are obsolete, most of which would apply
to Germany as well as to the United States.
Unfortunately, according to Zarnowitz, all of these
arguments "leave ample room for counterarguments".35
• Downsizing and rationalization are asserted to
have enhanced the general stability of the economy.
But through cost-cutting and more effective production, effective downsizing leads to growth and, ultimately, to subsequent opportunities for "upsizing."
Inflationary pressure and other cyclical problems may
also return with the recovery, for as the economy becomes expansive again, upward wage adjustments
and associated inflationary pressure will usually follow.
• Breakthroughs in information technologies are also
thought to stabilize the economy as they induce
increased investments and business profits. But these
productivity-enhancing effects have yet to be
documented quantitatively, and any specific link
between information technologies and the stability of
economic growth remains unclear.
• It is supposed that improved inventory control,
especially
through just-in-time
management
techniques, has helped to stabilize the economy. But
Zarnowitz finds that constant dollar inventory investments in the 1990s remained about as "volatile and as
cyclical" as in the past.
• The growth of the service economy adds stability,
since the more volatile manufacturing and
construction sectors have declined in significance.
This is probably true,; but with growing international
competition in services, they are also becoming more
cyclical.36
• Deregulation of financial and other industries is
34
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believed to have added stability. More competition in
airlines, trucking, banking, etc., has enhanced
productivity growth, but it is unlikely that further
deregulation will promote further stability.
• Discretionary macro policies could also be the
source of greater cyclical stability. Macro-economic
control through interest-rate adjustments has been
quite effective in recent years as compared to the
earlier effort to manage money growth. But policy
agents cannot always anticipate and avert business
recessions or financial crises, and policies can still be
"wrong, mistimed, or bungled".37
.
• The most sweeping argument is that the whole
process of globalization has reduced instability. The
opening of new foreign markets reduces our dependence on domestic demand as the primary factor in
maintaining prosperity. Large-scale importation of
resources and products reduces inflationary pressure
from domestic markets in periods of rapid expansion.
Globalized capital markets are broader and more
liquid, reducing the risk of market bubbles and
crashes. But at the same time, we have also seen
added stock market volatility and vulnerability of the
general economy to financial and foreign currency
market instability like that experienced in the Asian
crisis.
The extension of national into world markets may
lend greater impetus to economic recovery and
growth, but that does not guarantee that instabilities
can be kept out of the brave new, worldwide system.
Weaknesses and Potential Problems
The United Nations38 assumes that the United
States economy will slow down in the near future. For
them, the only issue is whether good policy and fortuitous environmental factors will make the landing a
soft one. Because the labor market has become very
tight, because of the "high valuation of the stock
market," it is impossible that the recent growth of
consumption could be indefinitely sustained. 1999
witnessed some decline in the economy's utilization
of capacity and growing pressure on profit margins,
so it is expected that some sectors may already be
seeing a slowdown in investment.

The US stock market and financial markets are
deeper and more liquid than those in other countries,
so that in the past few years, after the onset of the
Asian Crisis, a large pool of capital began to flow from
the emerging markets to the United States. A boom in
equity prices occurred as capital flowed in". This
further stimulated the domestic economy via the
increased consumer demand it helped produce.
Lower interest rates meant that consumption needn't
be crowded out by the boom in the markets for capital
equipment and high tech products.
The so-called wealth effects discussed above have
been enhanced by boom conditions in real estate
markets. The latter, as usual, accompanied the stock
market boom, increasing the sense of wealth through
increased home values. But the consumption frenzy
of recent years has extended well beyond those
Americans with growing portfolios. Even where there
has been no participation in stock market capital
gains, the consumption of US households were the
driving force of the boom. The level of consumer debt
argues that the nation has been on a consumption
binge which extended the expansion.
The consumption binge also explains the huge net
import situation in the US balance of payments. The
worldwide perception of US economic strength has
kept the dollar strong in foreign exchange markets,
giving American consumers very favorable terms of
trade. Other countries have also benefitted from the
strong dollar, since the US economy has provided the
rest of the world with a robust export market. At the
same time, through the greater part of the expansion
period the US economy enjoyed very favorable international commodity prices, especially those of
petroleum products, until the resurgence of OPEC in
1999.
Unfortunately, the question about the expansion is
not whether, but only for how long it can be sustained.
Increasing energy prices can be expected to spill over
and drive up the prices of numerous other products of
which energy is an important component. Fortunately,
higher energy prices alone could not undo such a
strong expansion; unfortunately, higher energy prices
are not the only factor currently working against the
boom's extension.
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Increasing tightness in labor markets prompted
interest rate increases by the Fed after mid-1999. In a
tight labor market, the likelihood of significant wage
increases impacting price indices was much more
apparent. Higher interest rates discourage the
consumption of durable goods and put a damper on
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aggregate demand. All of this threatens at a time
when we have been watching a sluggish or stumbling
stock market through much of the year 2000.
Through 2000 we observed that the weak Euro is
merely the mirror image of the dollar's strength, in turn
a reflection of the global perception of US economic
strength. When the consumption binge ends and the
economy slows, it will become apparent that the
dollar can change places with the Euro quite quickly.
When that change occurs, dramatically increased
import prices will further constrict consumption and
raise the prices of imported commodities and many
others whose production requires imported parts and
materials. This too will prove ballast for an economy
with clipped wings.
All of, this is merely to suggest that the expected
slowdown could be something other than a soft landing.39 With good fortune, long-term economic adjustmentSrWill be made gently and gradually, so that an
upward flight might be resumed before too long. Let
us hope that is the case, since not only the prosperity
of the US is involved; a hard landing could spread
hardship through all the global trade and financial
networks.
Whither the New Economy?
The use of the expression "New Economy"
throughout this paper demonstrates the author's view
that, when limited to a few, glamorous high-tech
sectors, the term is misused. We have in fact only one
economy. If the new sectors^ of the economy do not
interact with and change economic processes in the
old sectors, creating a whole new economic structure,
we should not talk of a New Economy. Since a series
of Kondratieff-type changes have in fact spread their
influence through the entire economic organism, the
term should be applied to the whole economy.
It should come as good news that even if the New
Economy is not recession-proof, its effects will not
evaporate in a slowdown. As we watch the diminution
of near-term prospects and await the arrival of some
painful adjustments, we may be assured that the
internet economy and its companion, the relentless
process of globalization, are here to stay. They will
39
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serve as the basis of a recovery, of an expansion, and
of future well-being.
The benefits of the service and internet economy
will continue to spread, affecting our partners and
competitors on the global scene. Global trade and
finance will be important agents in the enhancement
of prosperity. At the same time, the prestige the
United States has enjoyed early in this bold new era
will inevitably have to be shared. Germany and Europe
will continue to become more closely integrated in the
new economic structures.
Stierle40 admits that Europe lags behind the USA in
terms of the consistency and high level of the growth
process, i.e. the macro performance of the economy.
Moreover, the share of new technologies in the aggregate capital stock, the ratio of IT and high-tech
products to the gross domestic product is substantially lower in the leading European countries than in
the United States., and the contribution of these new
sectors to national growth is also smaller east of the
Atlantic. Per capita expenditures for information and
communications technologies in 1999 were only a little over half as much in Europe as in the USA, and
the number of internet users per 100 citizens was
nearly three times higher in the United States. Stierle
assures us, correctly, that this gap will be greatly reduced in the next few years, just as the gap, for example, in the use of mobile telephones narrowed,
-then disappeared. Stierle is certainly not the only European who would tell us41 that the growth of the internal European market, its continuing liberalization
and deregulation, the introduction of the euro, and
continually increasing competitiveness, will all enhance European dynamism. This is all symbolically
manifest in the European Commission's strategic initiative "eEurope 2002" to make the use of the internet a more integral part of education programs and
to promote e-commerce among member countries.
A parallel development will be the full adoption of
the euro; its establishment may prove more competition for the dollar than Americans would wish. If the
Europeans continue on the path of economic recovery
and expansion and the US continues, hopefully, with
its soft landing, the euro could replace the dollar as
the engine of growth in the world economy. But for
both the Europeans and the United States, the adjustments required by the next few years of the globalization process will prove demanding. Progress is
always demanding.
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